The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2026 devotes a chapter to critical infrastructure, which is becoming increasingly important, interconnected, and vulnerable. What does this mean for those involved in business continuity?

Critical infrastructure has one distinctive feature: when it’s working, we hardly even notice it’s there. Electricity, water, telecommunications, transportation, data centers, and digital networks are simply there. They only become visible when something goes wrong, and it is precisely this apparent normality that leads us to underestimate the risk they pose.

In the Global Risks Report 2026, the World Economic Forum devotes an entire section to this topic, with a title that leaves little room for interpretation: “Infrastructure Endangered.” The central message is simple: the infrastructure on which economies and societies rely is becoming simultaneously more important, more interconnected, and more vulnerable.

An underestimated risk, but one that is no longer ignored

In the 2025–2026 Global Risks Perception Survey, disruptions to critical infrastructure rank only 22nd among perceived risks over a two-year horizon and 23rd over a ten-year horizon. However, this data must be viewed in context: compared to the previous edition, the risk has risen by four positions in the short term and by two in the long term. Perceptions are changing, but slowly. The paradox becomes apparent when looking at the consequences. The respondents themselves cite the disruption of systemically important supply chains, economic slowdown, and the inadequacy of public infrastructure and social protection systems as the main effects of an infrastructure disruption. In other words, critical infrastructure rarely poses an isolated risk; rather, it acts as a multiplier of other risks. A power outage does not affect only the electrical grid. It can bring telecommunications, IT systems, transportation, payments, industrial production, water distribution, and healthcare services to a standstill. The blackout that struck the Iberian Peninsula on April 28, 2025, demonstrated this within a few hours: trains at a standstill, mobile networks struggling, and electronic payments blocked. It is this capacity for propagation that makes critical infrastructure a central issue for resilience.

1. Infrastructure Built for a Different World

The report identifies three forces that will act simultaneously in the coming years. The first is very concrete: aging. A significant portion of the infrastructure in industrialized countries was built in the decades following World War II. Electric grids, water systems, bridges, roads, and railways now require increasing investments for maintenance, upgrades, or replacement, competing with many other public spending priorities. The risk is not necessarily a sudden, catastrophic collapse. It is something far less dramatic: corrosion, material deterioration, insufficient redundancy, obsolete components, and deferred maintenance. These are vulnerabilities that accumulate over years without becoming apparent, until the day when a combination of circumstances transforms a seemingly minor technical problem into a major disruption. The second force is climate change. Heat waves drive up energy demand and put strain on grids. Floods disrupt transportation, telecommunications, and public services. Prolonged droughts compromise water availability and energy production. Heavier rainfall quickly overwhelms drainage systems designed decades ago. The issue is not just the physical robustness of the structures, but the assumptions on which they were designed. Infrastructure may perfectly meet the requirements for which it was built and still prove inadequate for today’s climate.

2. Everything depends on electricity, and electricity depends on everything

Meanwhile, our economies are becoming increasingly electrified. Electric mobility, industrial automation, digital systems, and, increasingly, artificial intelligence are driving up demand on the grid. The WEF cites estimates suggesting that the power required by AI data centers in the United States could rise dramatically over the next decade. Electricity is thus becoming a primary dependency. At the same time, energy production and distribution are becoming increasingly digitized. This creates a closed loop:

  • The economy depends on the power grid;
  • The power grid relies on digital systems;
  • Digital systems rely on energy and telecommunications.

We no longer manage individual pieces of infrastructure; we manage systems of systems. A power outage can disrupt water distribution. A lack of water can shut down industrial plants and power plants that rely on it for cooling. A telecommunications outage can prevent remote control of networks. The loss of a data center can render applications unavailable that are used simultaneously by hundreds of organizations. In practice, many impact analyses treat these dependencies as binary variables inputted into a single process: power available or unavailable, telecommunications available or unavailable, cloud available or unavailable. But these services depend on one another. A serious resilience analysis should therefore go beyond first-level dependencies to include second- and third-level dependencies. ISO 22301 already requires the identification of dependencies and interdependencies of priority activities; the next step is to extend the analysis along the entire chain.

3. The Geopolitical Dimension and Cyber-Physical Risk

The third factor identified by the WEF is geoeconomic competition, which amplifies existing vulnerabilities in the physical, cyber, and cyber-physical domains. Submarine cables, satellites, pipelines, power grids, ports, and communication systems have both economic and strategic value. They can therefore become both tools and targets in competition between states. Digitalization is making the distinction between physical and cyber attacks increasingly blurred. In April 2025, attackers gained access to the control system of a dam in Bremanger, Norway, and fully opened a spillway gate for about four hours. No damage occurred: the additional flow, about 500 liters per second, was well below the facility’s capacity. However, two details are significant. Access was gained through a control panel exposed to the internet and protected only by a weak password. And a few months later, Norwegian security services attributed the attack to pro-Russian hackers. No sophisticated operation was needed: all it took was a door left ajar. For an organization, however, the cause of the incident is often secondary. If power, communications, or access to essential infrastructure is lost, operations come to a halt—whether the cause is a malfunction, a flood, a cyberattack, or a hostile act. There is also a consequence that risk managers should not overlook. According to the WEF,the insurability of infrastructure failures could decline, and an increasing share of restoration costs would fall on individuals and organizations. Transferring the risk becomes more difficult; what remains is the ability to absorb it.

4. From a Single Asset to an Ecosystem of Dependencies

This evolution calls for a shift in how we think about business continuity. For many years, we have developed plans focused primarily on internal resources: people, buildings, ICT, suppliers, and documentation. But an increasing portion of our ability to continue operating depends on infrastructure that the organization does not control. You can have an excellent Disaster Recovery Plan, but without connectivity, the alternate data center is unusable. You can have emergency generators, but the fuel comes from a supply chain that is itself affected by the disruption. You can have alternate locations, but reaching them becomes impossible if transportation is at a standstill. The European regulatory framework is moving in the same direction. The CER Directive (transposed in Italy by Legislative Decree 134/2024) shifts the focus from asset protection to the resilience of critical entities. NIS2 extends security obligations to a much broader scope. In the financial sector, DORA requires an assessment of the risk of concentration among third-party ICT providers. The common thread is the same: resilience does not stop at the organization’s boundaries.

5. Infrastructure can be critical even if you don’t own it

This is perhaps the most useful question to ask in a BIA: Which infrastructures that we do not own could still disrupt our critical processes? Energy , telecommunications, water, transportation, cloud services, data centers, payment systems, and satellite services. In most cases, we have no control over their availability. However, we can identify our dependencies on them, assess realistic scenarios of unavailability, and prepare alternatives. Above all, we can stop implicitly assuming that they will always be available.

Questions for Resilience Managers

  • Does our BIA treat energy, telecommunications, and cloud computing as binary dependencies, or does it also analyze their second- and third-level dependencies?
  • Do disaster recovery solutions (alternate sites, generators, DR) really work if the outage also affects the infrastructure on which they themselves depend?
  • How long can critical processes operate without power or connectivity, and has this duration been verified through testing or is it merely an estimate?
  • Do we have exercise scenarios that simulate widespread infrastructure disruptions covering a large area and lasting more than 24 hours?
  • Do we know which of our critical suppliers share the same infrastructure—and therefore the same point of failure?
  • If insurance coverage were to be reduced, what portion of the cost of a business interruption would we be able to absorb?

Conclusion

An aging population, harsher weather, and geopolitical tensions—amplified by digitalization and electrification—do not describe a world in which infrastructure will constantly fail. They describe a world in which a single disruption can spread much more quickly and much farther. For those concerned with resilience, the task is not to predict which infrastructure will fail. It is to understand what happens to one’s organization when that infrastructure—whatever the cause—is no longer available: because infrastructure does not become critical simply because it belongs to us. It becomes critical when we can no longer operate without it