For years, the protection of critical infrastructure has been addressed primarily as a matter of physical security: identifying strategic assets, protecting them from hostile incidents, and reducing their vulnerability. The new European framework takes a broader perspective. It focuses not only on the integrity of the infrastructure but also on the ability to continue providing essential services even when an incident affects part of it. This is the change introduced by Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities, known as the CER Directive. The directive defines resilience as the ability to prevent an incident, protect against it, respond to it, withstand it, mitigate its consequences, absorb it, adapt to it, and recover from it. In Italy, the directive has been transposed by the Legislative Decree No. […], dated September 4, 2024 134, whose provisions take effect on October 18, 2024. The decree refers to “critical entities” and links resilience to services that are essential to society, the economy, healthcare, public safety, and the environment. For those involved in resilience, this is the most interesting aspect: the focus shifts from the protection of resources to an organization’s ability to maintain its critical functions.
A true “all-hazards” approach
Risk assessment must take into account the full spectrum of events that could compromise an essential service: natural disasters, man-made events, public health emergencies, hybrid threats, cross-border events, and other hostile threats. The approach is therefore explicitly “all-hazards” and goes beyond a plan designed for a single scenario. For a Resilience Manager, this means shifting the focus from the cause of the incident to its operational consequences. There is no need for a separate plan for every possible event. What is needed is to understand which functions must be maintained, which resources are truly indispensable, which dependencies can be eliminated, and which capabilities enable operations to continue under adverse conditions.
Interdependencies are factored into the risk assessment
Perhaps the most interesting change concerns interdependencies. In risk assessment (Article 12 of the directive), the critical entity cannot limit itself to what happens within its own perimeter. It must consider the extent to which other sectors depend on the service it provides and the extent to which it itself depends on essential services in other sectors, including those in neighboring Member States. This is a legal recognition of an obvious reality. An electric grid depends on telecommunications and digital systems. Telecommunications depend on energy. Transportation depends on energy, communications, and information systems. Hospitals depend on electricity, water, telecommunications, supplies, and transportation. A local failure can quickly spread to other systems. A methodological clarification: The regulation does not mention “second- and third-level” dependencies. To respond seriously to that requirement, however, stopping at the first level is rarely sufficient. This is a conclusion based on best practices, not a legal obligation.
From an Emergency Plan to a Resilience Plan
The decree requires critical entities to adopt appropriate and proportionate technical, security, and organizational measures. These measures cover incident prevention, physical protection, response and mitigation (including crisis management), recovery, business continuity, and the identification of alternative supply chains to restore essential services. The critical entity must prepare a resilience plan describing the measures adopted and update it as necessary, and in any case, at least every three years. It is not mandatory to draft a new, separate document: the directive refers to a plan or “equivalent document,” so crisis plans, security plans, recovery plans, or other documents may be used, provided they meet the requirements. This is a pragmatic approach. Resilience does not come from a proliferation of plans, but from the ability to integrate existing ones and assess their effectiveness as a whole.
Resilience also applies to people
The measures must take into account personnel, critical functions, external parties performing relevant activities, access criteria, background checks for sensitive roles, training, and awareness-raising. This is yet another sign: resilience is now a well-rounded organizational capability. An infrastructure may be technically intact but still fail to provide service if there is a shortage of staff, if crisis roles are unclear, if crucial skills are concentrated in just a few people, or if those responsible for responding are not properly trained. People, processes, technology, facilities, and suppliers are all components of a single system.
CER and NIS2: The Line Between the Physical and Digital Worlds Is Blurring
The CER Directive was developed in parallel with NIS2, which focuses on cybersecurity, and this decision reflects another transformation: critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly cyber-physical. A power plant, a water system, a port, or a rail network depends as much on digital systems as it does on physical components. A cyberattack can have both operational and physical consequences, while a fire, a flood, or a power outage can compromise IT and telecommunications systems. In Italy, NIS2 was transposed by Legislative Decree 138/2024 and the CER by Legislative Decree 134/2024, both adopted on the same day. They have different objectives but are complementary: entities identified as critical under the CER are also considered essential entities for the purposes of NIS2. From an operational standpoint, the regulatory distinction should not lead to an organizational separation. In a crisis, the cause may be cyber-based or physical, but the question remains the same: which services are affected, which dependencies are involved, and what capabilities must be mobilized to maintain essential functions?
Banks and Financial Infrastructure: DORA Replaces CER
For the banking sector, the situation is different, and it is worth stating this clearly. Article 8 of the CER stipulates that, for critical entities in the banking, financial market infrastructure, and digital infrastructure sectors, Article 11 and Titles III, IV, and VI of the directive do not apply. In practice, neither the resilience obligations of Chapter III (risk assessment, measures, plan, incident reporting) nor the oversight provisions of Chapter VI apply. Legislative Decree 134/2024 transposes this exclusion. A bank may therefore be identified as a critical entity, but the operational obligations stem from sector-specific regulations. For banks and other financial entities , DORA—Regulation (EU) 2022/2554—is applicable as of January 17, 2025. DORA itself states that the physical resilience of financial entities is comprehensively addressed by ICT risk management and reporting obligations. For digital infrastructure, however, NIS2 applies. DORA is also a sector-specific Union act for the purposes of Article 4 of NIS2, and it takes precedence over NIS2 regarding ICT risk management, incident management and reporting, digital resilience testing, information sharing, and ICT supplier risk. The goal is to avoid duplication. For a bank, the issue of critical infrastructure must therefore be understood through the lens of DORA and the prudential regulations on business continuity, with particular attention to dependencies on telecommunications, technological infrastructure, cloud providers, and other critical ICT suppliers. The analysis of interdependencies, which the CER requires of critical entities, remains a sound approach even where it is not a CER requirement.
The National Strategy for the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure
In April 2026, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers adopted the National Strategy for the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, as provided for in Article 6 of Legislative Decree 134/2024. The document was published on June 11, 2026, nearly eleven months after the July 17, 2025, deadline set by the regulation. According to the legal commentary, the Strategy does not introduce any obligations beyond those in the decree, but rather outlines the approach that the authorities expect. Resilience must be addressed using an “all-hazards” approach, taking into account natural, technological, human-induced, hybrid, and cyber risks collectively, with a focus on continuous improvement rather than mere formal compliance. The document also highlights the need for a better understanding of the interdependencies among essential services and the vulnerabilities of the supply chain, and notes that an incident affecting a single operator can have a ripple effect on other sectors. It is foreseeable that these principles will also serve as a reference for oversight by the competent authorities, but this is a prediction, not a rule.
Where We Stand: The Schedule
July 17, 2026, was the deadline—both at the European and Italian levels—for finalizing the list of critical entities. The process outlined in Legislative Decree 134/2024 is as follows.
- January 17, 2026: The relevant sectoral authorities identify the critical entities in their respective sectors.
- July 17, 2026: The deadline for adopting the list by Prime Ministerial Decree expires. The decree stipulates that the Prime Ministerial Decree is not subject to publication and is not subject to public access: the entities included are notified of their inclusion.
- Within 30 days of adoption: notification to the identified parties.
- Notification + 9 months: Risk assessment of the critical entity.
- Notification + 10 months: implementation of resilience requirements. For entities notified between July and August 2026, this means spring 2027.
Among the requirements is the reporting of significant incidents: an initial notification within 24 hours of the entity becoming aware of the incident and a detailed report within one month. The decree establishes a system of penalties for violations.
The Commission’s Guidelines of July 2026
On July 10, 2026, the European Commission adopted a Communication setting out non-binding guidelines on resilience measures (C/2026/3712, published in the Official Journal of the EU on July 13). They specify the technical, security, and organizational measures that critical entities may adopt pursuant to Article 13, and call for consideration of relevant international and European standards. They should be viewed as a guide to best practices, not as obligations. They reaffirm the “all hazards” approach—that is, natural and human-induced risks, whether accidental or intentional. The message aligns with that of the broader framework: not a plan for every possible event, but resilience robust enough to function even when the actual scenario does not match the anticipated one.
From Infrastructure Protection to Service Resilience
The change introduced by the European framework goes beyond a regulatory overhaul. Previously, the question was how to protect infrastructure. Today, the focus has shifted to the essential services that depend on it, the interdependencies with other components, and the organization’s ability to maintain its functions when part of the system is compromised. The issue of critical infrastructure is no longer limited to physical security; it encompasses crisis management, supply chain resilience, cybersecurity, and operational resilience. The principle that emerges has become central to risk management: an infrastructure is not critical merely because of what it is, but above all because of the consequences that arise when it ceases to be available.
Questions for Resilience Managers
- Is our organization, or could it be, a critical entity? And if it isn’t, do we provide services to those that are?
- Does the crisis, security, and recovery plan we have in place cover the measures required by the directive (Art. 13), or should it be incorporated into a single resilience plan?
- Does our risk assessment take into account which services from other sectors we depend on, and which sectors depend on us?
- Are we able to report a significant incident within 24 hours?
- For banks: Are our scenarios regarding dependence on energy, telecommunications, and the cloud covered by ICT risk analysis and DORA testing?


